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Abstract
Debt with many creditors is analyzed in a continuous-time pricing model of the
levered rm. We specically allow for debtor opportunism vis-a-vis a non-coordinated
group of creditors, in form of repeated strategic renegotiation oers and default threats.
We show that the creditors' initial entitlement to non-collateralized assets will be ex-
propriated through exchange oers. Exchange oers successively increase the level of
collateral until all assets are fully collateralized. The ex ante optimal debt contract is
neither fully collateralized nor without any collateral. Diusely held debt allows for
a larger debt capacity and bears lower credit risk premia than privately held debt.
We derive simple closed-form solutions for the value of equity and defaultable bonds.
Numerical estimates show that the bond valuation is very sensitive to the correct spec-
ication of the debt renegotiation model.
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Introduction
Recently, a growing body of literature has introduced corporate nance concepts into valua-
tion models of defaultable securities, and endogenized variables such as the capital structure
choice, the lower reorganization bound and the outcome of bargaining between debtor and
creditors in fully dynamic models.1 Yet in all the existing work incorporating capital struc-
ture theory or bargaining models into debt valuation theory, the number of creditors has
been ignored and implicitly, a ction has been invoked that the borrower is confronted with
a single \representative" creditor.
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly model the strategic interaction between share-
holders and creditors when there are multiple creditors. We study dynamic strategies of
debt renegotiation and default in this environment and analyze the impact of the optimal
opportunistic debtor strategy on the value of defaultable bonds and the ecient nancing
of projects.
There is little reason to assume that creditors would coordinate their responses to a
renegotiation oer or a default threat: An individual creditor will prefer to free-ride on the
debt restructuring eort of others, and the larger the number of creditors, the stronger this
tendency to hold out.2 Individual creditors are not inclined to make concessions, although
they realize that doing so would be in their collective interest.3 The importance of the
hold-out eect is highlighted by numerous empirical studies showing that out-of-court debt
restructurings with many creditors bear a substantial risk of failure.4
This does not imply, however, that diusely held publicly traded debt is immune to
1Building on Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) endogenize the share-
holders' decision to trigger liquidation and determine the optimal capital structure of rm. Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999) extend the analysis to allow
for the strategic interaction between shareholders and debtholders in debt renegotiation, prior to liquidation.
2More precisely, the theoretical literature shows that individual investors' incentives to hold out depends
on the probability of being decisive or \pivotal" for success or failure of the tender oer. This probability
depends on the relative size of a creditor's debtholdings - quite similar to the analogous eect emerging in
takeover bids studied by Grossman and Hart (1980) and more rigorously by Holmstrom and Nalebu (1992).
Incomplete information is a necessary ingredient to obtain this result, but the prediction is fairly robust with
respect to changes in the informational assumptions. For these results, see e.g. Detragiache and Garella
(1996) and Hege (1999).
3The eective renegotiation-proofness of widely dispersed debt has inspired a number of theories about
the choice of the number of creditors or the choice between private and publicly traded debt. In Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996) and Berglof and von Thadden (1994), contracting with two creditors rather than a single
one or contracting with a complex debt structure commits the debtor to refrain from strategic default.
4Empirical work by Brown, James and Mooradian (1993)(1994), James (1995)(1996) Franks and Torous
(1989)(1994), Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Gilson (1997), Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), Helwege
(1994), Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) and Hotchkiss (1995) shows evidence in this respect.
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renegotiation eorts. But it means that debt restructuring proposals must be engineered
so as to spoil the attractiveness of the hold-out option. Oers can be successful if they are
designed to dilute the value of creditors rejecting the oer. Opportunistic shareholders, if
faced with a non-cohesive group of creditors, have powerful devices at hand to exert such
dilution threats which are unavailable vis-a-vis a single creditor, namely strategies which
essentially threaten to relocate wealth between creditors.
Dilution threats of this sort have in common that they (i) impose a scheme of wealth
transfers from creditor to creditor, and (ii) make these transfers implicitly conditional on
rejection of the debt restructuring proposal. These strategies are coercive since creditors
stand to lose if they do not accept the restructuring proposal, relative to those who do.
Creditors are made to rush in to tender, in particular if the number of new contracts is
limited and they are served on a rst-come-rst-serve basis.
Debt-for-debt exchange oers proposing more senior or secured claims are the leading case
of such dilution threats. Empirical literature suggests that they are in fact very common.5
A well-known example are the so-called \exit consents".6 In an \exit consent", the right to
participate in the exchange or tender oer is explicitly tied to a vote approving the exit from
a seniority covenant restricting the issuance of more senior debt (Roe (1987)). Bondholders
will then rst rush in to waive the covenant to secure their right to exchange; once the
covenant is stripped, each bondholder prefers to tender because if she were the only one to
hold out, the liquidation value of her single junior claim as well as the secondary market
value of a severely illiquid bond issue would suer.
The paper examines the optimal debt renegotiation strategy of an opportunistic debtor
facing a non-coordinated group of creditors in a continuous-time model of the levered rm.
The set-up of the model closely follows Mella-Barral (1999), but is adapted to allow for
multiple creditors. We allow for a rich set of actions at the discretion of the debtor and
study strategies of repeated debt exchange oers and dilution threats. The exchange oer
strategies available to shareholders follows closely the typical procedure in debt exchange
oers, allowing the debtor to oer more senior claims or additional collateral in exchange for
concessions in every round, as well as the possibility to default strategically. Importantly,
each of these actions can be taken at any time, and as often as the debtor likes.
Our results show that the dynamic dimension of the model is crucial: The debtor is limited
5In various samples compiled about US exchange oers, we found the following number indicating fractions
where more senior debt is oered: James (1996) 64 %, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) at least 28 %,
Chatterjee et.al. (1995) 76 %, Brown et.al. (1993) 43 % (research questions and sample selection criteria
dier widely).
6In the sample by Chatterjee et.al. (1995), 50 % of the tender oers and 33 % of the exchange oers
contain exit consents.
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in obtaining concessions from creditors precisely because subsequent debt renegotiations are
possible. We show that the debtor can only obtain concessions if she can credibly limit the
value of additional concessions she could obtain later on. We consider the most obvious
device to commit to such a limit, which is to oer additional collateral in each renegotiation
round in order to make the debt exchange oer acceptable.
We solve for the shareholder's ex post optimal exchange oer strategy, and show that
the shareholder will successively trade coupon concessions for increases in collateral values,
until all assets are pledged as collateral. Creditors' initial entitlement to a share of the non-
collateralized assets (by virtue of the Absolute Priority Rule) turns out to have simply no
value since it will subsequently be expropriated through an opportunistic debtor's exchange
oer strategy.
Moving backwards in time we then analyse the ex ante optimal contract with dispersed
creditors. We rst observe that if all assets are collateralized in the initial contract, then debt
is not renegotiable, and our set-up is then akin to Leland's (1994) model. We establish that
with fully collateralized debt contracts, there is a unique initial debt level leading to the rst
best rm value. We then nd that such a design is optimal, whenever the shareholder's needs
to raise funds remain below the maximal amount compatible with her not having incentives
to default earlier than optimal.
Conversely, if the funding needs of the shareholder are larger than this threshold amount,
then the optimal dispersed debt contract is renegotiable: It essentially provides for a rela-
tively large coupon as long as the rm does well, but embeds the possibility to obtain coupon
concessions once the rm's performance deteriorates.
More precisely, the debt contract must then be designed so as to commit the shareholder
to trigger her exchange oers in an optimal fashion. Depending on the initial level of the
coupon, this involves the design of an optimal level and dynamic evolution of the collateral
values, for which we identify the following trade-o: on the one hand, too high a collateral-
ization would not leave enough exibility to renegotiate debt ex post; on the other hand, if
too little of the assets are tied up as collateral when exchange oers are launched early, then
the shareholder would have incentives to trigger exchange oers prematurely.
We also examine the desirability of dispersed debt issuance over cohesively held (private)
debt: Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral
(1999) document the fact that with a single creditor, concessions can be forced with a
strategic default threat, i.e. the shareholder's threat to cease debt service payments and
walk away. However, this device has no power over dispersed creditors since they would
prefer to hold out. Thus, with dispersed debt the issuer is committed against the use of
strategic default threats. The debt renegotiation mechanism is dierent as dilution threats
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are the only vehicle to engineer debt concessions.
The choice of creditor dispersion therefore involves a comparison of dierent drivers of
contingent coupon concessions. We show that borrowing from dispersed creditors is attrac-
tive from an issuer's point of view, as (i) her capacity to raise funds is always higher and
(ii) the credit risk premium is lower than if she borrowed privately.
We analyze the pricing and eciency implications of these strategies and derive simple
closed-form solutions for the value of equity and defaultable bonds. Numerical simulations
show that with widely held debt, the default risk premiummay be reduced by a large margin
as compared to single-creditor debt. Using a wrong debt model can lead to substantial
pricing errors: Default risk premia and credit spreads are sensitive to whether the debt model
specication correctly accounts for themultiplicity of creditors and/or initial collateralization
of the debt.
We present the set-up in Section I. In Section II, we dene exchange oer strategies and
explain the mechanism of dilution. In Section III, we solve for the shareholder's ex post
optimal strategy. In Section IV, we determine the consequences for the creditors' willingness
to lend at entry and for the choice of the collateral structure. In Section V, we provide closed
form solutions and study a numerical example. Section VI discusses possible extensions and
concludes.
I. The Model
A. Operations and the Abandonment Decision
Consider a rm, set up by a person called the incumbent or shareholder at date t = 0, which
purchases a set of real assets worth I. The cash generating ability of these real assets is
related to a single uncertain state variable, xt, which summarizes economic fundamentals,
and follows a diusion process:
dxt = (xt) dt + (xt) dBt ; (1)
where B is a standard Brownian motion. Once the rm is set up, the incumbent can do the
following:
1. She can generate a period income ow, combining her human capital and protected
technology with the purchased real assets. Let (xt) denote the present value of a
perpetual claim on the income ow that results from such operations, assuming no
limited liability.
2. Although she could operate the rm forever, she can also abandon operations, and sell
the rm's real assets. Let V (xt) denote the liquidation value of the assets.
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We assume that an abandonment decision is irreversible. The abandonment decision is thus
best viewed as the decision to liquidate the rm or to le for bankruptcy. This set-up,
however, allows for a wider interpretation of this irreversible decision. For example, it allows
to capture aspects of the property rights view of the rm: abandonment means then that
relation-specic investments with a reduced value outside the rm are dismantled and parts
of the cash generating ability of the rm is lost, and irreversibility means that the restoring
of the combination of human and physical capital, after a period of abandonment, is not
costless.
Whatever the preferred interpretation, we assume that there are some states of the world
x where other parties, like competitors, have a better use for the assets than the incumbent.
In these poor states, V (x) is actually greater than (x) and the abandonment decision is
desirable, as formalized by Assumption 1 below. We assume that (x) is increasing in x;
this is not necessarily the case for V (x). All assets are assumed to be tangible in the sense
that all of V (x) can be pledged as collateral.
B. Value of the Firm under the First Best Abandonment Policy
The value of the rm, for a given closure policy, is readily obtained. If operations are
abandoned the rst time the state variable xt reaches a lower level y, the rm is worth
V (xt j y)  (xt) + [V
(y) (y)] P(xt  y) : (2)
The rst term on the right hand side, (xt), is the value of a perpetual entitlement on
the current ow of income. The second term is the product of the change in asset value
intervening when the irreversible regime switch occurs, [V (y) (y)], and a probability-
weighted discount factor for this event, P(xt  y) which we now dene.
We assume risk neutrality and a constant safe interest rate, .7 We denote by T 
inff  j x = y g the rst time at which the state variable xt hits the level y, and by ft(T )
the density of T conditional on information at t. Then the probability-weighted discount
factor P(xt  y) is just the Laplace transform of ft(T )
P(xt  y) =
Z 1
t
e (T t)ft(T ) dT : (3)
Clearly, the rst best policy consists of selecting the abandonment trigger level, y, in order
to maximize V (xt j y). The ex ante optimal abandonment trigger level, which we denote ~y,
must therefore satisfy the rst order condition
@V (xt j ~y)
@~y
= 0 : (4)
7Harrison and Kreps (1979) show how to extend the results of the paper to a world, without risk-neutrality
by using an equivalent martingale measure.
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Sucient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the optimal abandonment trigger
level ~y are guaranteed by:
Assumption 1 At the entry state x0, the option value of the decision to trigger liquidation
at y,
[V (y)   (y) ] P(x0  y) ; (5)
is a strictly concave function in y, maximized at a trigger level ~y strictly smaller than x0.
We assume that the project is actually worthwhile undertaking at the entry state x0, i.e. the
initial investment I is less than the value of the rm under the rst best policy, V (x0 j ~y).
Thus, the incumbent has the best use for the assets in the good states, but in low states of
the world it becomes eventually optimal for the incumbent to abandon the rm. Figure 1
illustrates this set-up.
This structural model, consisting of (i) the rm and its project, f(x); I;x0g and (ii)
its uncertain environment, fx;(x);(x); ;V (x)g is expressed in rather general terms. In
Section V, we will consider a standard parametrization of the model, which will permit to
derive closed-form solutions for the securities values and the key variables.
The set-up so far is identical to Mella-Barral (1999). This is deliberate since it will allow
for a direct comparison of the results, and hence for an analysis of the dierences between a
rm choosing to nance with private debt and a rm issuing publicly traded debt. We will
next adapt Mella-Barral's model to allow for multiple creditors.
C. Financial Contracts
In order to nance the initial investment, I, the incumbent needs to seek external nancing
since she has only limited wealth. Denote by ID  I the amount that needs to be nanced
externally. Only debt contracts are available8, and they are restricted to the form D0 
f0;C0(x)g:
1. A promise of a perpetual ow of coupon payments, 0.
2. The right, if the incumbent repudiates the contract, to impose a prespecied sharing
of the liquidation proceeds V (y) (invoking debt collection law). The details of this
sharing rule are as follows:
8This assumption should be thought of as being the consequence of the following implicit assumptions: xt,
(xt) and V (xt) are only veriable in the case of liquidation, and it is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to
write contracts conditional on xt, (xt), V
(xt) or past repayments. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
derive the optimality of debt contracts, and we refer instead to the security design literature showing when
debt contracts are optimal, including the costly state verication model pioneered by Townsend (1979) and
incomplete contract models as e.g. in Hart and Moore (1998).
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(a) A portion C0(x) of the proceeds of the liquidation sale, V
(x), is secured by
collateral.
(b) Each debtholder is entitled to a par value, P = 0=, before the incumbent receives
anything. The contract is subject to the Absolute Priority Rule.
The only element of this contract which is more general than a standard debt contract is the
function C0(x) which is referred to as the initial collateral. C

0(x) species each creditor's
collateral value as a function of the total liquidation proceeds, V (x).
We assume that there are N bonds issued and that each creditor holds only one bond.
The number of creditors N is so large that each creditor will behave atomistically, and
in particular completely neglect his impact on success or failure of a debt restructuring
proposal.9
Trading of assets occurs continuously in perfect and frictionless markets with no asym-
metry of information. Furthermore, we abstract from the insider-outsider agency conict
between shareholders and management and assume that the incumbent maximizes the share-
holder value.
II. Multiple Creditors and Debt Renegotiation
A. Shareholder Opportunism
The need to issue debt opens up a basic conict of interest between incumbent and outside
investors. The incumbent has residual control rights,10 i.e. the right to freely decide on the
use of the assets as long as she meets her contractual obligations. The nal control decision
appertaining to the shareholder is the selection of the abandonment trigger level, y.
Related to this nal choice, the shareholder decides in continuous time whether and
when to renegotiate the debt contract. She decides on a sequence of oers launched to
obtain concessions from the creditors, possibly supported by (credible) strategic default
threats. The decisions on the renegotiation oers and the nal abandonment decision are
interdependent since the total amount of concessions on the debt services determines when
the shareholder will nd it optimal to trigger the abandonment decision.
The shareholder maximizes solely the value of her equity and acts in a purely opportunis-
tic fashion vis-a-vis the bondholders. She anticipates fully the impact of her renegotiation
oers on her choice of abandonment trigger level, y. If the incumbent could nance the entire
9This is a standard assumption since Grossman and Hart (1980).
10This terminology follows Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
7
initial investment, then the rst best abandonment trigger level, ~y, would easily be imple-
mented. An agency problem arises, however, because the incumbent has limited wealth,
implying that the resulting value of the rm, V (xt j y), could be below the rst best value
V (xt j ~y).
B. Exchange Oer Strategies and Dilution Threats
Dispersed creditors (bondholders) act as a non-coordinated group in our model. This has
two important eects on debt renegotiation: rst, in contrast to a large creditor, a small
individual creditor will not necessarily accept a Pareto-improving exchange oer since if
enough of the other creditors accept, he might be better o by holding out. Second, the
shareholder has the possibility to exploit the non-cohesiveness of the creditors by attaching
dilution threats to an exchange oer.
To account as much as possible for the shareholder's options, we endow the shareholder
with a rich set of strategies to pursue coercive strategies via dilution threats which we call
the set of exchange oer strategies. A single exchange oer is a proposal of a limited number
of new debt contracts in exchange for voluntary surrender of old contracts. This follows
closely the typical procedure in debt exchange oers. We dene the set of exchange oer
strategies formally as follows:
Denition 1 An exchange oer strategy, s  f (xk; nk;Dk) j k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg g, is a collec-
tion of sequential debt exchange oers (xk; nk;Dk), where xk is the timing (trigger level) of
the kth oer, nk  nk 1 is the number of new contracts oered, Dk = fk;Ck(x)g is the new
debt contract replacing the contract Dk 1 and K is the number of oers.
The shareholder will choose the exchange oer strategy that maximizes her equity value.
The restriction to a nite number of oers is without loss of generality since it turns out
that the last oer is well dened. Therefore, any exchange oer strategy can be represented
as a nite sequence. The idea behind an exchange oer strategy can be explained as follows:
1. When the state variable reaches the kth threshold level, xk, the shareholder proposes
the nk 1 creditors who hold contracts Dk 1 to exchange their existing debt contract
for a new one, Dk. As before, the new contract is characterized by a coupon, k, and
the collateralized portion of the liquidation value, Ck(x). We only consider exchange
oers to those creditors who hold the contract oered in the previous round; we will
argue in Section III.F that this is sucient to describe the shareholders' options.
2. In practice, a vast majority of exchange oers are conditional on some sort of minimum
acceptance rate, and they often also try to incite creditors to \rush in" by limiting
the number of contracts available for exchange or by drastically limiting the time
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window where exchange is guaranteed. Because all creditors will tender in the equilibria
described below, we can without loss of generality assume that the kth exchange oer
is made conditional on nk creditors tendering.11 We will make use of the accounting
convention n0 = N .
3. If the initial contract is protected by some covenant against further issuance of debt
it clearly must be removed for an oer to be valid. Typically, bond indentures require
some majority or super-majority of m  0:5 in order to alter any covenant. In practice,
the covenant can be removed using an exit consent solicitation12, i.e. the right to tender
is tied to approval to exiting from the protective covenant. To ensure the uniqueness
of the equilibrium analyzed below, we formally assume that in the initial debt contract
D0, there is no seniority covenant and therefore m = 0.
4. The number of exchange oers, K, is endogenously determined by the game between
shareholder and creditors; K could be nite or innite. The shareholder cannot ex
ante commit to a certain number K.
5. We allow the shareholder to enforce every exchange oer with a strategic default threat.
A strategic default threat means that the shareholder can commit to cease debt service
payments and walk away if the oer is not accepted (if not at least nk creditors tender
for the kth oer). As a consequence, all what creditors can do if a strategic default
treat is attached to an exchange oer and the oer is rejected, is to seize the court and
to distribute the liquidation value V (x) according to seniority.
The size of acceptable coupon reductions will be limited by incentive compatibility condi-
tions of the creditors. One important consequence of these incentive compatibility conditions
is well-known: Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), among others, have shown that pari passu
oers (equal seniority) will not be accepted. To see the reason, recall that every debt value
can be decomposed into two components, the value of debt service payments (only coupons
in this model) on the one hand, and the value of the residual claim rights on the other hand.
Since a hold-out can assure himself the initial coupon without any negative consequences, he
cannot be made to accept a lower coupon unless the value of his liquidation right is higher
when accepting than when rejecting.
11The assumption that the number of available new contracts is shrinking with each exchange oer sim-
plies the calculations greatly: It allows to analyze the strategy choice of an individual creditor without any
strategic spillovers, i.e. the value functions of a creditor for its various options vis-a-vis an exchange oer
are independent of the other creditors' choices.
12Section 316(b) of the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires that each individual bondholder agrees
to any change in a core term of a bond issue such as principal amount, interest rate, or maturity. However,
protective covenants that limit the rm's capacity to issue senior debt can be altered through a majority or
super-majority vote.
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Since all liquidation proceeds will belong to the creditors anyway (by virtue of the Ab-
solute Priority Rule), the increase in the residual claim must come at the expense of other
creditors. Therefore, a successful exchange oer must threaten to relocate wealth between
creditors, or in other words contain dilution threats against the creditors' residual claim
rights.
Such a dilution threat essentially implies a reduction in the expected liquidation rights
value of those creditors who decline the oer. Notice that multiple creditors are essential
since a redistribution of wealth between creditors can only be engineered if creditors cannot
coordinate their strategies.
Clearly, if the shareholder proposes residual claims of higher seniority than the seniority
of all claims issued before, other things being equal, this makes the oer more attractive
relative to the position of those creditors who do not exchange. Since the dilution threat is
purely based on a mechanism relocating wealth between creditors, oering higher seniority is
a costless, but valuable device to use for the shareholder. Therefore, in an optimal exchange
oer strategy, the shareholder will always make full use of this option to senioritize the
residual claims. Henceforth, we consider that in every exchange oer, the par value is
strictly senior to all claims issued earlier and that the liquidation value is strictly impaired
by the contracts on oer.
C. Dilution Threats in Practice
Throughout this paper, we use debt-for-debt exchanges oering more senior debt claims
and notably increases in collateral as the leading case for dilution threats. Empirical work
suggests that other techniques with the same economic eect are also common in practice.
We wish to emphasize that the economic mechanism behind these alternative strategies is
much the same as in the debt-for-debt exchange cum collateral increase on which we focus
in this model, viz. it is based on dilution threats.
Many debt-for-debt exchange oers shorten the maturity of the debt claims. Because the
debt is risky, this increases the expected value of a tendering creditor's residual claim. The
extreme form of maturity shortening is a cash payment.13 The form of such bond workouts
is more like a tender oer in that, rather than oering new securities, the bonds are bought
back for cash.14
A very common alternative for rms seeking debt restructuring consists of selling assets
13In samples compiled about US exchange oers, we found the following about fractions proposing maturity
shortening (including cash oers): Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) 67 %, Chatterjee et.al. (1995) 27 %.
14Companies seeking debt restructurings are typically companies in nancial distress. The fact that so
many of them are willing to spend cash, typically a precious resource for distressed rms, to buy back
long-term securities may appear less puzzling once it is put in the perspective of dilution.
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at the same time. Again, this reduces the value of existing liquidation rights: The cash
proceeds of asset sales may be redistributed to tendering bondholders if they are used to
nance a cash tender oer. They may also be used to sweeten a debt-for-equity exchange
oer, e.g. if they are set aside for future dividend payouts. So even if debt is exchanged for
equity or other junior claims, it can still be the case that the oer is based on a dilution
threat, in that if higher cash ow promises are made, the implicit liquidation value of those
holding out is lowered.
Similarly, it is possible to spin o valuable assets into a dierent legal entity beyond the
reach of existing debtholders.15 Other options of dilution include risk-shifting investments.16
Finally, increasing the par value of some creditors without any change in the seniority also
dilutes the value of existing liquidation rights.17
In general, exchange oer strategies of the kind analyzed here can be viewed as transfers
from pre-repudiation income rights to increased liquidation rights. Our analysis applies to
any restructuring package oering this combination in order to overcome the hold-out eect.
The repeated nature of possible dilution threats implies that they can only be successful
if accompanied by a (credible) pledge that the newly extended, more senior liquidation right
is irreversible. This is formally shown in Lemma 1 below.
In this paper, we discuss additional collateral as the most obvious candidate to make
such an irreversible pledge. Our use of the term collateral should be understood in a wide
sense, as encompassing all contractual designs where the gap in the residual value between a
tendering creditor and a hold-out is irreversible. It includes other mechanisms, like the ones
just discussed, that oer explicitly or implicitly the same guarantee to creditors that their
liquidation rights cannot be expropriated in successive renegotiation rounds.
D. Exchange Trigger Points
It will not be optimal for the shareholder to trigger new oers unless conditions worsen,
so the asset valuation problem will be path-dependent only as far as the minimum state
is concerned. Therefore, one additional state variable, xt, is sucient to keep track of the
path-dependence. xt denotes the historical minimum reached by the state variable xt since




The time interval between the kth and the k + 1th exchange oer will be referred to as
15See Amihud, Garbade and Kahan (1998) for an example.
16Bernardo and Talley (1996) show how this can be strategically used to aect the outcome of exit consents.
17Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) report that successful renegotiations frequently imply an in-
crease in the face value of debt in exchange for temporary debt deferrals.
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\regime" k. Given that these oers are respectively triggered the rst time xt reaches the
levels xk and xk+1, regime k corresponds to xt 2 (xk+1;xk]. Immediately after entry the
rm is in regime 0, after the rst oer in regime 1, and so on until the last regime K which
is maintained until abandonment.
For all xt 2 (xk+1;xk], the value of the shareholder's claim will be denoted by S
(k)(xt)
where the superscript (n) designates the regime k. The K +1 regimes give a suciently ne
information partition for our purposes and the actual historic lows xt can be omitted from
the notation. After K debt exchanges are completed, the nal decision that the shareholder
will take is the abandonment decision, by repudiating debt contracts when xt reaches the
abandonment level, y.
We denote by Tk the set of successfully tendering debtholders in the kth exchange oer,
and by Hk the set of debtholders that are holding out (or being held out) in the kth round
for the rst time. Note that creditors in the set Hk have by denition successfully tendered
in all previous rounds. Therefore, the set of successfully tendering debtholders corresponds
to Tk  f1; : : : ;nkg and the set of debtholders being held out to Hk  fnk+1; : : : ;nk 1g. In
regime k, the value of the claim of each debtholder who tendered and succeeded in obtaining
the new contract in the most recent oer (the kth oer) will be denoted by D(k)i2Tk (xt). The
value of the claim of each debtholder who was held out in the most recent oer (hence
succeeded in all prior oers) will be denoted by D
(k)
i2Hk







After the kth oer, the value of the claim of a creditor i 2 Hj, a creditor held out or
holding out in the jth round, is easily determined: Once he is held out, a creditor also
knows that the residual claim value of his bond is Cj 1(y). If the shareholder will ultimately













P(xt  y) where j 2 f1; : : : ; kg (7)
We can also write the value of the nk most senior debt contracts, when the k + 1th oer
will be made, the rst time xt reaches xk+1. Bondholders will rush in to tender their old
contracts, but know that they will succeed in getting the new one with probability nk+1=nk,
and fail with probability (nk   nk+1)=nk. The value of the claim of a tendering creditor

















Therefore, the value of these nk most senior contracts, before the k + 1th oer occurs can be
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P(xt  xk+1) : (9)
Finally, after the K th oer, the value of a creditor who successfully tenders in this last




















P(xt  y) (10)
Expression (10) takes into account that any non-collateralized assets after the last oer,




j (y), would be equally distributed among the nK holders
of the most senior claims, that is the creditors successfully tendering in the last round. The
value in the last regime of a creditor held out in the K th oer is as stated in expression (7).
III. Ex Post Optimal Exchange Oer Strategy
In this section we study the ex post behavior of the shareholder, assuming that the project
is nanced with K debt contracts D0  f0;C0(x)g. That is, we examine the most oppor-
tunistic exchange oer strategy she can implement, once the debt is issued.
We begin deriving a lower boundary for the ex post value of the debt, and an upper
boundary for the ex post value of the equity. We then solve for the shareholder's ex post
optimal exchange oer strategy, by showing that the shareholder is actually able to attain
this upper boundary level.
A. Limit Values
Once the debt is issued, the most the shareholder could possibly obtain when she makes
an oer consists of (i) minimizing the debt value while (ii) maximizing the total value of
the rm. At the time she proposes a new contract, the maximum she can hope to achieve
consists of (i) minimizing to zero the relative surplus given to tendering creditors for debt
exchanges to occur, while (ii) maximizing the rm value to its rst-best value.
Now, a bondholder can always decide never to tender, and his claim would at least yield
a coupon ow 0 until operations are abandoned. If debt contracts initially carry a collateral
C0(x), then in spite of all of the shareholder's dilution eorts, the debt value cannot possibly
be reduced below, as viewed from the point of entry x0,









P(x0  y) : (11)
This is the minimal possible value ex ante of the claim of a creditor who decides to hold
out in the rst oer, and the value of each creditor's claim is bounded from below by this
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creditor reservation value. Consequently, at the point of entry the upper bound on the equity
value can be determined as
S(x0)  max
y
f V (x0 j y)   N D(x0 j y) g : (12)

















ŷ = ŷ(0; C0(x)) is a function of both components of the initial debt contract, the coupon 0
and the collateral function, C0(x).
B. The Shareholder's Optimization Problem
We solve next for the shareholder's ex post optimal exchange oer strategy. When deter-
mining her optimal exchange oer strategy, s, the shareholder works backwards in time,
evaluating the entire sequence of decisions available to her, from the nal abandonment to
the point of entry. Therefore, the shareholder's ex post optimization problem will be broken
down into a recursive sequence of constrained optimization problems.
For any given exchange oer strategy, s = f (xk; nk;Dk) j k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg g, she rst
calculates the optimal abandonment trigger level, ys, which occurs after all exchange oers
have been played out. This trigger level ys, solves
ys  arg max
y
(









Proceeding backwards, the shareholder then calculates the sequence of optimal oers,
from the last exchange oer to the point of entry. She optimizes recursively each one of theK
oers, for a given prior exchange oer strategy. She does this for all k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg, starting
at k = K and nishing at k = 1. The result of previous optimizations k 2 fj + 1; : : : ;Kg
are fed back in the k = j exchange oer optimization problem.
The characteristic parameters, (xk; nk;Dk), of a shareholder's optimal k
th exchange oer,





















We will denote by S the set of exchange oer strategies s which are optimal ex post from
the shareholder's perspective, i.e. which solve the above recursive optimization problem.
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Equation (16) is called the \kth rationing constraint", as it reects the condition that the
number of new contracts will be (weakly) lower to the number of contract in the most senior
class.
Equation (17) is called the \kth tendering constraint", guaranteeing that tendering the old
debt contract is better than holding out. It states that, considering the rationing involved,
the proposed new contract, Dk, must be more desirable than the current one, Dk 1, at
the time of the oer, so that tendering debtholders i 2 Tk are better o than hold-outs,
debtholders i 2 Hk.
Since the problem is recursive in nature, satisfying the kth tendering constraint in equation
(17) is less straightforward than it might appear: This condition contains value functions
which depend on possible subsequent exchange oers. Determining a feasible exchange oer
strategy must also take into account the potential time consistency problems of such a
sequence.
Loosely speaking, for a bondholder to tender in state xt, it must not only be the case that
(i) the expected payo from holding out is smaller than the value from tendering, but (ii)
the value from tendering must also take into account that the bondholder may be exposed to
further strategic exchange oers in the future. We will show next that the recursive structure
of the tendering constraints yields considerable cutting power regarding the set of feasible
exchange oer strategies.
C. The Commitment Problem and the Role of Collateral
Consider the subset of exchange oer strategies where the fraction of the liquidation value
of the rm which is collateralized does not evolve, i.e. Ck(x) = C

k 1(x) for some k 2
f1; : : : ;Kg, in other words the only reward given to tendering creditors is seniority. Under
such strategies, debtholders held-out in earlier rounds are always better o than those held-
out in later rounds. This is because the former will ultimately have accepted less reductions
in coupon than the latter. Therefore, in any subsequent regime k
0












for all j > l; where j and l 2 f1; : : : ; kg :
In this case, the shareholder's dynamic optimization problem exhibits the following feature:
If the tendering condition is binding in the kth round, then the tendering condition in the
k   1th round cannot be satised.
Consequently, such repeated oers suer from a time consistency problem: Debtholders
always reject a rst exchange oer, because, if the shareholder has later the possibility to
make a second oer, this oer will be such that holding out was actually preferable in the
rst place. The repeated nature of the problem imposes an interesting credibility constraint
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on feasible strategies of the shareholder. Creditors will not tender in the kth oer if the total
residual claim value handed out to the creditors tendering in the k+1th oer can be as high





shareholder has to rene her oer and to give tendering bondholders more than just higher
seniority: She must commit not to dilute the rewards again in subsequent oers.
Lemma 1 Bondholders will never accept an exchange oer which only oers higher senior-
ity. For an oer to be acceptable, there must be a value increase in residual claim rights
which are immune to further dilution.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Recall that the number of oers, K, is endogenous and that the shareholder can always
propose yet another oer. Therefore, as long as the liquidation rights are not secure, the
shareholder can and will launch a subsequent oer which expropriates the liquidation rights
through the attribution of more senior claims.
According to Lemma 1, the shareholder must provide a guarantee that the value gain
in residual claims of tendering creditors cannot be expropriated in subsequent renegotiation
rounds. Any such guarantee must set some of the rm's assets aside and exclude them from
further dilution. We consider additional pledges of collateral as the device to oer such a
guarantee, but refer to our discussion in Section II.C that other techniques could be used as
well.
In the kth exchange oer, a commitment against further dilution consists then of a pledge
of a new collateral Ck (x) replacing the old collateral C

k 1(x) for each tendering creditor.
Even if held out in future renegotiations, each tendering creditor is then assured to receive
at least Ck 1(x), if abandonment occurs in state x.
An exchange oer strategy, f (xk; nk;Dk) j k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg g, must therefore involve new
contracts, Dk, that specically increase the level of collateralized residual claims, Ck(x), from
the level attained earlier, Ck 1(x).
We can now also clarify how the number of exchange oers, K, is determined. The last
or K th exchange oer is the oer where the last part of the assets is fully collateralized,




j (x). Subsequent oers will be rejected, according to
Lemma 1, and are irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome.
The question is then how much new collateral must be added at every round for the
exchange oer to be dynamically incentive-compatible, i.e. to be acceptable for creditors
rationally anticipating that further exchange oers are possible. We nd that:
16






(xk), can be written





[1   P(xk  ys)]
P(xk  ys)
: (19)
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 says that in order to get bondholders' approval, an exchange must contain an
irrevocable pledge of more collateral. If there are K consecutive oers, then each of these
oers must oer sucient new collateral to meet condition (19). After the kth successful
oer, the remaining claims to the liquidation value that the shareholder can still redistribute
strategically in subsequent oers is bounded by the value of not yet collateralized assets,





D. Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We turn our attention to the creditors' strategies and the condition when the equilibrium
outcome is unique. Throughout, the equilibrium outcome that is analyzed is as follows: once






(xk), is satised, enough of the remaining nk 1
creditors tender in order to pick all of the nk new contracts on oer. This certainly is a
(subgame perfect) equilibrium since the sequence of dynamic incentive constraints ensures
that the creditors' strategies are best responses.
This leaves the question of uniqueness of this outcome since in renegotiation games with
many parties like ours, the multiplicity of equilibria is often endemic. For example, if N   1
creditors were to always reject every oer in all renegotiation rounds, then always rejecting
could well constitute a (subgame perfect) equilibrium response for the last creditor even
if the incentive constraint (19) holds strictly and the outcome is independent of the last
creditor's response.
Technically speaking, the necessary and sucient condition for the uniqueness of our
equilibrium is that the minimum number of accepting creditors in the rst oer, mN , is not
larger than one. Note that if mN > 1, then if N   1 creditors were to reject, the decision of
the last creditor would be irrelevant for the allocation since the number of rejecting creditors
would exceed the minimumacceptance rate. Rejecting would then be an equilibriumresponse
for every creditor, and always rejecting could be sustained as equilibrium. To exclude this
unwanted outcome, the shareholder can always use the following exchange oer strategy:
(i) Propose in all oers just a single contract,18 nk = 1 for all k = 1; :::;K and (ii) let
the inequality (19) hold strictly in all K oers. Tendering is then the unique equilibrium
18Since there is no non-negativity restriction on k, the shareholder can get the same aggregate coupon
reduction from a single creditor that she can get from a large number of creditors.
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response for all N creditors in the rst oer, and tendering is the unique response for the
remaining creditor in all subsequent oers.
With this strategy, the only point where multiple equilibrium outcomes could possibly
arise is during the rst exchange oer, and only if the initial contract contained a minimum
acceptance rate mN > 1, for example a seniority covenant which can only be removed by
a majority or super-majority. Since this is not the case by assumption, the equilibrium
outcome is indeed unique.
E. Fully Collateralized Debt
An important insight of Lemma 2 refers to the particular case where all of the rm's
assets are already fully collateralized. This is the case when the initial debt contract, D0 
f0;C

0(x)g, involves an initial collateral function C

0(x) = V
(x)=N , for all x:
Corollary 1 Fully collateralized debt or debt not backed by collaterizable assets cannot be
renegotiated.
Corollary 1 sheds light on a prominent special case in the structural pricing literature, the
valuation of non-renegotiable debt claims, as they in particular assumed in Leland (1994)
and Leland and Toft (1996). In other words, our model can explain the two joint conditions
which make the assumption of non-renegotiability realistic: if (i) debt claims are widely
dispersed and (ii) the debtor has no latitude to make irreversible dilution threats. The
latter is true when all separable or pledgeable assets are already collateralized, or when the
rm's assets are completely intangible.
F. Optimal Exchange Oers
The shareholder's optimization problem can now be rewritten in terms that are more directly
related to the variables she actually controls, after replacing the kth tendering constraint
with the more specic condition (19). The characteristic parameters (xk; nk; k; C

k(x)) of a






















[1   P(xk  ys)]
P(xk  ys)
: (22)
This formulation of the shareholder's recursive optimization problem enables us to char-
acterize more precisely the set of optimal exchange oer strategies, by rst establishing the
following crucial Lemma:
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Lemma 3 If exchange oer strategy s is optimal, then the tendering constraint (22) is bind-
ing for every exchange oer k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is that in every exchange oer, reducing the new coupon
on oer promises the shareholder a twofold gain. First, it reduces the debt service payments
value over the expected time horizon until the rm is liquidated. Second, since the aban-
donment trigger level y is monotonic in the nal aggregate coupon value, it prolongs the life
expectancy of the rm, and over the additional life span, the equity value must be positive.
Thus, the shareholder will reduce the new coupon on oer until the tendering constraint
binds.
The fact that the tendering constraint must be binding at every exchange turns out to be

















P(xk  ys); (23)
















P(x1  ys): (24)























P(xt  ys) : (26)
Consequently, the ex post equity value under an optimal exchange oer strategy













Importantly, since equations (27) and (12) are identical, the shareholder will choose the
same abandonment point, ys = ŷ (where ŷ is dened in (13)). Therefore, the solution of (27)
corresponds exactly to what we established to be the upper limit on the shareholder's value
function,














That is, the shareholder's ability to renegotiate ex post limits the initial value of diusely
held debt to exactly the creditors' reservation value.
D(0)(xt) = D(xt j ŷ) : (29)
In essence, creditor's initial entitlement to a share of the non-collateralized assets is
worthless since it will be expropriated through an exchange oer strategy, before repudiation.
The ex ante value of non-collateralized assets is ex post fully internalized by the opportunistic
shareholder.
We can now also see why it is unimportant that the kth exchange oer is only addressed
to the kn 1 creditors in the most senior class, Tk 1, as we assumed all along. At the time of
the oer, the market has already fully priced in the fact that the creditors' entitlement to
a part of the non-collateralized assets is worthless (see Eq. (23)), and there is no structural
dierence in the debt valuation expression between the most senior and more junior creditors.
The dollar amount of coupon reduction that one additional dollar of pledged collateral can
obtain is purely driven by the tendering constraint (21), irrespective whether a creditor is in
the most senior class or not. The shareholder would get exactly the same dollar amount of
concessions if addressing the oer to more junior creditors.
We have not yet discussed the eciency of this ex post solution. If ys = ŷ 6= ~y, then
the value of equity plus debt, S(0)(xt) + N D(0)(xt) = V (xt j ŷ), is below the rst best rm
value V (xt j ~y), and value is destroyed. We turn next to the question of maximizing the rm
value.
IV. Ex Ante Financing and Contract Design
In Section III, we studied the ex post behavior of the shareholder, assuming the project to
be nanced with K given debt contracts D0  f0;C0(x)g. Working backwards in time, we
will now drop this assumption. Taking the opportunistic ex post optimization into account,
we determine which debt contract shareholder and creditors will nd feasible and optimal
at the date of entry.
A. Ex Ante Optimal Debt Contract
At the date of entry, the incumbent chooses a debt contract, D0  f0;C0(x)g, which
maximizes the value of equity net of her investment, S(0)(x0)  [I  D(0)(x0)]. She therefore





f V (xt j ŷ)   I g (30)
subject to: ID < N D
(0)(x0) ; (31)
0 < N C0(x) < V
(x) ; for all x : (32)
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The best she can achieve is a value of equity net of her investment equal to the rst best
rm value minus the overall investment needed to implement the project, V (xt j ~y)   I.
Therefore, ex ante the shareholder seeks to maximize rm value. Her problem vis-a-vis the
debtholders is to establish credibly, from the point of view of the debtholders, that she will
stay the course ex post, i.e. that she is committed to an exchange oer strategy s which
brings ys = ŷ(0; C

0(x)) as close as possible to ~y.
The ex ante problem in the contract design is essentially about establishing this com-
mitment. The two instruments to engineer such a commitment are (i) the choice of debt
coupon obligation, 0, and (ii) the choice of the initial collateral, C0 (x), which species the
liquidation value of the assets collateralized as a function of the abandonment state, x. To
understand the required relationship between 0 and the function C0(x) for the rst best to
be attained, contrast the equations dening ~y and ŷ = ŷ(0; C

0(x)):
(a) On the one hand, the ex ante optimal abandonment trigger level,
~y  arg max
y
f V (xt j y) g : (33)

















Our rst question concerns the right balance between (i) pre-abandonment income rights
(the coupon obligation) and (ii) post-abandonment income rights (the collateralized assets),
such that the pair of instruments ( 0;C0(x) ), induces an ecient abandonment decision,
ŷ = ~y. Inspection of the maximization problem (34) provides the following answer:
Condition 1 An optimal debt contract D0 involves a pair (0; C0(x)) of coupon obligation
and debt collateral such that






P(x0  y) ; (35)
is a quasi-concave function in y, with maximum at the ecient abandonment level, ~y.
Condition 1 expresses necessary and sucient conditions on the initial contract (0; C0(x))
ensuring that the rm attains its rst best value, V (x0 j ~y). Rewriting expression (35) as
(V (y)   (y))P(x0  y) + N (0=   C0(~y)) P(x0  y), we know that the rst term
(V (y)   (y))P(x0  y) is maximized at ~y, by virtue of Assumption 1. Therefore, suf-
cient (but not necessary) for Condition 1 to hold is that (0; C0(x)) be chosen such that
(0=   C0(~y)) P(x0  y) is concave with maximum at ~y.
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We can immediately gain some useful insights from Condition 1. If Condition 1 holds,



















= 0 : (36)







P(x ~y) + [V (~y) (~y)]
@P(x ~y)
@~y
= 0 : (37)
















Inspection of condition (38) reveals the following relationship between coupon and value
of initially collateralized assets. To engineer an increase in the initial market value of a debt
issue, D(0)(x0), the necessary increase in the coupon level 0 must be accompanied by either
(i) a corresponding increase in the value associated of collateralized assets, C0(~y), or (ii) a
higher value sensitivity to state, dC0 (~y)=d ~y, around ~y, or a combination of both alternatives.
In our analysis of the ex ante optimal contract, we turn now to the following questions:
First, are there circumstances under which the incumbent can do as well issuing debt con-
tracts which are either fully or not collateralized at all? Second, can she do as well borrowing
from a single creditor, or when would she actually prefer dispersed debt?
B. Debt Collateralization and the Value of Renegotiable Debt
Turning to the rst of these questions, we will now discuss when and why the optimal collat-
eral choice must be strictly interior to the extreme cases of either pledging all collateralizable
assets or no assets at all. We refer to this as partial collateral.
Consider rst the extreme case where the debt is initially fully collateralized, i.e the ini-
tial debt contract D0  f0;C0(x)g involves C

0 (x) = V
(x)=N for all x. We have already
discussed this particular case in Section III.E. Since renegotiation is then impossible (Corol-



















P(xt  ŷf) ; (39)
S
(0)
f (xt) = V (xt j ŷf )   N D
(0)
f (xt) : (40)
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Here, ŷf , the shareholder's non-cooperatively optimal abandonment trigger level corresponds
to ŷ(0;V (x)=N) and maximizes equity value:
ŷf  arg max
y
















Now, an increase in the coupon obligation precipitates shareholder's abandonment, hence
increases ŷf . That is, since  N [1   P(xt  y)]0= is negative and strictly increasing in y,
for all y < xt, Assumption 1 implies
@
@ 0
[ ŷ (0; V

0 (x)=N) ] > 0 : (42)
It follows that, given full collateralization, there is a unique threshold amount of debt service
obligations, ~0, giving rise to the ecient abandonment decision, ŷf = ~y. Consequently, only










P(x0  ~y) ; (43)
will issuing fully collateralized debt ensure that the combined value of equity and debt,
S
(0)
f (xt) +N D
(0)
f (xt j ŷf ), equals the rst best value of the rm, V (xt j ~y).
On the one hand, if the amount of outside funding ID is smaller than ~ID and fully
collateralized debt is issued, the incumbent will default \later" than would be rst best, i.e.
she will abandon operations at a state y strictly smaller than ~y. Conversely, if ID is larger
than ~ID and fully collateralized debt is issued, the incumbent will default \earlier" than
would be rst best, i.e. at a state y larger than ~y.
If ID is smaller or equal to ~ID, then issuing renegotiable debt, debt where renegotiation
and coupon concessions will occur in poor performances, is not desirable because the debt
coupon concessions would imply that the shareholder defaults even later than if the same
coupon had been issued with full collateral attached, thus worsening the ineciency problem.
There is, however, a simple solution in this case. The following simple capital struc-
ture policy is optimal and always feasible: Just issue fully collateralized bonds, D0 
f ~0;V (x)=Ng, with an aggregate initial value of N D
(0)
f (x0) =
~ID, that is a leverage ex-
actly equal to the debt level where full collateralization is ecient. Any surplus of funds,
~ID   ID, can be used to either reduce the initial equity contribution, I   ID, or to increase
the dividend payout.
On the other hand, if the required outside funding ID is larger than ~ID, then the renegoti-
ation option can add value to the rm and to the shareholder's equity: Creditor concessions
can increase the ex ante rm value if they postpone the implied abandonment point towards
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the ecient point, ~y. In this case, whenever the debt contract (0; C0 (x)) gives rise to an
exchange oer strategy where the rm does not fully renegotiate unless the rm conditions
deteriorate, then including renegotiation options in the contract design adds value. A debt
contract (0; C0(x)) satisfying Condition 1 is then optimal.
If ID > ~ID, then giving the shareholder incentives for the optimal timing of exchange








Expression (44) says that the value of remaining non-collateralized assets, left for the share-
holder to engineer strategic debt exchange oers, V (~y)   N C0(~y), is locally decreasing in
x, around the point ~y. That is, it increases as the state x deteriorates and approaches the
abandonment point. This means that it is worthwhile for the shareholder to postpone the
exchange oers so as to capture this additional value of her bargaining chip, which will only
accrue if the eective abandonment point is close enough to ~y.
Overall, the trade-o that determines the optimal choice of the instruments is as fol-
lows. On the one hand, the possibility to renegotiate debt terms eciently when the rm
approaches the lower reorganization bound (low xt) must be assured, by leaving a suciently
large portion of assets free from initial collateral pledges, V (x)   N C0(x). On the other
hand, creditors must be given protection from the premature exercise of these imbedded debt
renegotiation options, and this is achieved through a suciently high level and steep slope
of C0(x). A steep slope of C

0(x) means that the shareholder is rewarded with in increase in
the value of her bargaining chip, but only if she shows patience in proposing exchange oers.
Therefore, many simple specications of the initial debt collateral lead to an ex ante loss of
value, because ex post, the shareholder would choose an exchange oer strategy leading to
an inecient abandonment point at ŷ dierent from ~y. We can summarize:
Proposition 1 (i) If at the date of entry the required level of outside nancing, ID, is
smaller or equal to ~ID, the rst best rm value can be realized by issuing dispersed debt
which is fully collateralized and has an initial value of N D(0)(x0) = ~ID. The debt is not
renegotiated after it is issued, and the shareholder abandonment trigger level is the ex ante














P(xt  ~y) ; (45)
S
(0)
f (xt) = V (xt j ~y)   K D
(0)
f (xt) : (46)
19Condition (44) is obtained by comparing the rst-order condition resulting from (41) and condition (36).
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(ii) If ID > ~ID, then issuing a debt contract satisfying Condition 1 is the optimal form of
dispersed debt. After the debt is issued, the shareholder follows a non-cooperative optimal
exchange oer strategy, s 2 S, and her abandonment trigger level is the ex ante optimal one,










P(xt  ~y) ; (47)
S(0)(xt) = V (xt j ~y)   N D
(0)(xt) : (48)
Thus, a clear case distinction in the optimal debt design emerges as to whether optimally
designed debt should be state-contingent or not. We say that the debt contract (0; C0(x))
is state-contingent if it induces exchange oers which are contingent on the rm performing
poorly and the state variable deteriorating below the entry state, x0, i.e. an exchange oer
strategy s such that xK < x0. In the presence of dispersed creditors, state-contingent debt is
both feasible and value-increasing if and only if the required funding level, ID, exceeds the
highest level that can be eciently managed with a non-renegotiable contract as in Leland
(1994).
Consider now the other extreme case, where the debt is initially not collateralized at all,
i.e. the initial debt contract D0  f0;C0(x)g involves C

0(x) = 0 for all x. Such a bond
could only satisfy Condition 1 if it were a zero coupon bond, 0 = 0, implying a zero debt
value, D(0)(x0) = 0. Therefore, any debt issue with a positive market value but without
collateral, C0(x) = 0, cannot attain the rst best rm value. For any bond without initial
collateral, irrespective of the coupon 0, the shareholder's optimal strategy would be to make
a single exchange oer leading to full collateralization of the debt immediately at the date
of entry, x0. This would be fully priced in, and nothing is gained compared to the issue of
fully collateralized debt.
Proposition 2 Dispersed debt with zero collateral, C0 (x) = 0, is never preferred over the
issue of fully collateralized debt.
This result simply says that zero collateral debt will never lead to a rm value above the
rm value attainable by issuing non-renegotiable (fully collateralized) debt. It follows that
if state-contingent debt is optimal, then the shareholder will optimally issue debt with a
collateral value evolving between the two extreme cases. Moreover, Condition 1 ties down
the optimal form of C0(x) rather rigidly, and many forms of partial collateral will not lead
to the desired state-contingency: If the shareholder were to issue collateral with a value
evolution which is strictly proportional to the liquidation value of the rm's assets, then the
shareholder would deploy a non-contingent exchange oer strategy and fully collateralize all
assets at the date of entry, x0, just as in the case of zero collateral.
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C. Debt Capacity and the Role of Creditor Dispersion
At entry, the project can be nanced if there exists a feasible debt contract, D0  f0;C0(x)g,
such that the aggregate market value of debt equals ID, the required funding level:
ID = N D
(0)(x0) : (49)
The debt capacity, the absolute limit to the amount dispersed creditors are willing to lend,
is equal to the highest feasible aggregate value of bonds issued at entry. We denote by (x0)
the debt capacity of the rm,
















Suppose the required level of nancing, ID, is greater than the debt capacity, (x0). Since
we consider a project with positive NPV, i.e. ID  I < V (x0 j ~y), the project will then
not nd nancing although it is worthwhile undertaking it. In this case, the agency conict
between the shareholder and outside investors leads to a nancial constraint.
To better understand the relationship between creditor dispersion and debt capacity,
we have to compare to the case where there is just a single creditor, i.e. N = 1. In
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), concessions consist
of temporary debt service holidays. The shareholder makes take-it-or-leave-it oers to her
creditor, strategically paying less than the originally contracted coupon. In Mella-Barral
(1999), the shareholder asks for permanent reductions of debt obligations, forcing her creditor
repeatedly to forgive part of her debt. In all models, the debtor has all bargaining power
and exercises a strategic default threat : that is if the creditor were to reject her renegotiation
oer, the shareholder would cease her debt service obligations and force the creditor to call
for bankruptcy protection and have the rm liquidated, leaving the creditor a value of V (x).
As a result, the blackmailed creditor will accept any concession giving him a new debt value
of exactly V (x), his outside option.
The same threat does not work, however, with dispersed creditors: recall that any single
creditor is so small that her acceptance/rejection decision is not decisive for the outcome.
Hence, if all other creditors were to accept the oer reducing their aggregate value to V (x),
the best strategy of a single creditor would be to hold out. It follows that with dispersed
debt, strategic default threats cannot be successfully employed. The way to get concessions
from dispersed creditors is by pledging additional collateral in the way described earlier.
Thus, there are two dierences between single creditor debt and dispersed debt which
matter for the debt capacity. First, when facing a single creditor, an opportunistic incumbent
shareholder can wring concessions by repeatedly using strategic default threats, while the
same device has virtually no power against dispersed creditors. Second, if all debt is held
26
by a single creditor, then the degree of collateral is obviously irrelevant like any distinction
between senior and junior claims.
Comparison with Mella-Barral (1999) is straightforward since our set-up closely follows
his model. Therefore, Mella-Barral's (1999) Proposition 3 applies directly to our model:
When there is a single creditor, and the shareholder is in a position to make strategic
default threats (take-it-or-leave-it oers after defaulting) to this creditor, then the debt is
rst renegotiated the rst time the state variable, xt, hits a certain threshold level xs (i.e





















P(xt  xs) (52)
S(0)s (xt)  V (xt j ~y)   N Ds(xt) : (53)
When facing a single creditor, the shareholder will always ultimately abandon at ~y, the
ecient point. Therefore, it is as ecient to issue single creditor debt as it is to issue dispersed
debt with an optimal contract satisfying Condition 1, simply because for all x0 > xs
S(0)s (x0) + N D
(0)
s (x0) = S
(0)(x0) + N D
(0)(x0) = V (x0 j ~y) : (54)
The interesting dierence between a single creditor and dispersed creditors emerges when
considering the debt capacity. Because of the presence of the strategic default threat, the
absolute limit to the amount a single creditor is willing to lend at the entry state x0, is
V (x0), the liquidation value of the rm.20 With dispersed debt, we obtain a strikingly
dierent result:
Lemma 4 The debt capacity, (x0), is always strictly larger than V (x0).
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Therefore, by issuing widely dispersed debt, the shareholder can always borrow more
than by borrowing from just one lender:
Proposition 3 If at the date of entry the required level of nancing, ID, is not larger than
V (x0), then the project can be nanced with either dispersed debt or with debt held by a
single creditor.
If ID is larger than V
(x0) but smaller than the debt capacity, (x0), then the project can
only be nanced with dispersed debt.
20See Equation (44), Section 6.1., of Mella-Barral (1999).
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D. Limits of the Analysis
We have analyzed strategies of default and renegotiation when the debt is publicly held by
a large group of non-cohesive creditors. We have seen that for the debt to be renegotiated
ex post, a gradual collateralization of the debt needs to be allowed for ex ante.
It is important to recognize that in many cases, collateral consists of a collection of
assets whose liquidation values is determined by their physical characteristics. Therefore, in
practice there might be physical restrictions on the shareholder's ex ante choice of the initial
collateral, C0(x), that are imposed by the value evolution of the assets that are actually
collateralizable.
That is, our theory has only regarded the case where the shareholder is always able to nd
a particular combination of collateralizable assets, within the assets of the rm about to be
constituted, that commits her to the ecient abandonment decision, ŷ(0; C0(x)) = ~y. The
optimal dispersed debt contract D0 gives the rst best equity value to the shareholder if and
only if there exist collateralizable assets with an aggregate value C0 (x) satisfying Condition
1.
What is the shareholder's best contract design if a collection of collateralizable assets
satisfying Condition 1 does not exist? In this case, the shareholder will look for the second
best combination of assets, C0(x), which leads to a constrained ecient ŷ > ~y that is as
close as possible to the ecient abandonment point ~y. We certainly believe that in practice,
the shareholder's ability to oer the right debt collateral is often so limited that there is
no dispersed debt contract with optimal collateral design which can improve upon issuing
either (i) fully collateralized (non-renegotiable) debt or (ii) privately held debt with a single
or few creditors.
V. Implementing the Model
In this section, we provide conditions under which closed-from solutions can be obtained
for all the concepts and results of the paper. The closed-form solution allows for a quantitative
appraisal of the eects presented here, notably as to the potentially important role played
by (i) debt creditor dispersion and (ii) the debt collateral dimensions.
A. Closed-Form Solutions
To obtain closed-form solutions, additional structural assumptions are required in order to (i)
express the Laplace transform, P(xty), in simple fashion and to (ii) solve explicitly for the
dierent optimal decision trigger levels, using the relevant rst order optimality conditions.
We propose a structure, namely Geometric Brownian Motion plus linear income processes,
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which is reasonably general21 and simple. There also exist alternative model specications
allowing to implement closed-form solutions.
Assumption 2 (GBM-Linear Structure) : (i) The uncertain state variable, xt, describ-
ing the current status of the rm follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dxt = xt dt +  xt dBt ; (55)
where  <  and  are constants, and Bt is a standard Brownian motion.
(ii) There exists four constants 0, 1, 0, and 

1, where 0 > 

0 and 1 < 

1, such that
(x) = 0 + 1 x ; and V
(x) = 0 + 

1 x : (56)
Notice that the parameter assumptions 0 > 0 and 1 < 

1 guarantee that Assumption
1 is satised. Under Assumption 2:







where    2[ (  2=2)   ((  2=2)2 + 22)1=2].
2. Solving for the decision trigger levels yields simple expressions:









(b) Assuming that the incumbent chooses the time of her default in an unconstrained
fashion,22 the shareholder's ex post optimal abandonment trigger level, ŷ =





N0=  0 + 0N C

0(ŷ)




21This structure actually encompasses that of many existing corporate debt valuation models, including
Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989),
Mello and Parsons (1992), Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longsta and Schwartz (1995), Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Fries, Miller and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
They either take the total value of the rm's assets or the price of the commodity produced as the driving
process, and all assume xt to follow a geometric Brownian motion.
22This is the Endogenous Closure Rule assumed in Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Fries, Miller
and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999).
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In particular, when initially the debt is fully collateralized, i.e. C0 (x) = V
(x)=N ,









3. All asset pricing formulas have a simple functional form:
For A(xt) 2 fS(0)(xt) ; D(0)(xt) ; S
(0)
f (xt) ; D
(0)
f (xt) ; S
(0)
s (xt) ; D
(0)
s (xt) ; V (xt j y) g,
A(xt) = aA + bA xt + cA x

t ; (60)
where (aA; bA; cA) are constants. Table 1 contains the explicit expressions for the con-
stants (aA; bA; cA) for all asset values.
B. Pricing Impact of the Debt Model Specication
The practitioner's question will be: How important is the pricing impact of (i) creditor
dispersion and (ii) the collateralization of the debt analyzed in this paper? Is the potential
error due to a misspecication of the debt pricing model important or negligible from the
asset valuation point of view, i.e. the pricing error that occurs if a widely held debt security
is valued with a debt pricing model that does not allow for the specics of debt renegotiation
with dispersed creditors?
Arguably, the most commonly used measures of the impact of a given risk on debt value
are the risk premium investors require to compensate them for being exposed, and the
associated credit spread. Accounting for creditor dispersion and debt collateral design, the
default risk premium that our model generates is given by
p(xt)  0   D
(0)(xt) ; (61)




   : (62)
To inspect the importance of the debt model specication, we compare our model to the two
earlier introduced models developed for (i) single creditor debt (tantamount to the Mella-
Barral (1999) model) (ii) fully collateralized debt (tantamount to an adaptation of the Leland
(1994) model). We denote the default risk premium and the credit spread for these models
in a similar fashion as (i) ( ps(xt) ; ss(xt) ) and (ii) ( pf (xt) ; sf (xt) ), respectively:
ps(xt)  0   D
(0)







   ; (64)
pf (xt)  0   D
(0)






   : (66)
To measure the pricing impact of the debt contract choice, we consider the relative
dierences in default risk premia and credit spreads between the model proposed in this
paper and these two alternative models. Comparison with these two models allows us to
measure the valuation error due to model misspecication, and we measure the error along
the two dimensions which are important in our analysis:
1. The creditor dispersion dimension, comparing renegotiable debt with a single creditor








2. The state-contingency dimension, capturing to what degree the initial collateralization
allows for debt to be renegotiable, is measured by:
pf 
pf (xt)   p(xt)
p(xt)
and sf(xt) 
sf (xt)   s(xt)
s(xt)
: (68)
Conveniently, the default risk premiummeasures, ps and pf , turn out to be independent
of the current state xt.
For this analysis, we use the fact that in the GBM-Linear Structure, the rst renegotiation










We now give some numerical estimates carrying out a simple numerical application, under
the \GBM-Linear" structure which yields closed-form pricing formulas.
Example 1: The income generating process, xt, uctuates with  = 2% and  = 20%. For
the value of the rm's initial mode of operation, (xt) = 0 +1xt, we assume 0 = 0 and
1 = 1. After abandonment, the new parameters are V (xt) =  + 1xt, where 

0 = 0:5
and 1 = 0:5. The interest rate is  = 5%. There are N = 10 bonds issued, each carrying
a coupon 0 = 0:015 and a collateral of C(~y) = 0:04.
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In this example, the incumbent's initial advantage in using the assets is fairly large, but
the competitors' low value of 1 nonetheless ensures that eventual abandonment is optimal
(Assumption 1). Optimal abandonment will then occur at ~y = 0:6126, implying that the




= 0:08. The slope of the debt collateral function, dC0 (ŷ)=dŷ, is xed suciently
steep in order to satisfy Condition 1 (so that ŷ(0; C

0(x)) = ~y). These assumptions also
mean that the level of outside nancing, ID = N D(0)(x0), is relatively low. Notice that we
would get the same numerical estimates for any linear shift in the parameters 0, 0, 1
and 1, such that the dierences 1  

1 = 1=2 and 0  

0 =  1=2 remain unchanged.
Table 2 and Figure 2 exhibit the results obtained with these input parameters. The gures
are impressive: Notice in particular the impact of misspecifying for creditor dispersion, with
a relative measure of the default risk premium of ps = 375 %. In plain English, if the debt
model estimates default risk premia by wrongly assuming a single creditor when in reality
there are many creditors, the default premium would be almost four times overestimated!
Misspecifying the state-contingency dimension leads to similarly large errors: the relative
measure for the debt risk premium comes out as pf = 245 % which means that if the
debt model wrongly assumes non-renegotiable (fully collateralized) debt, then the default
premium is almost two and a half times overestimated.
Clearly, the magnitude of these dierences is also determined by the numerical input
values for the rm, fx; 0; 1; 0; 

1g, and its economic environment, f;; g. We do not
extend our numerical simulations, since our intention is merely to convey a qualitative insight,
which comes out rather strongly in Example 1: Default risk premia and credit spreads can
depend very substantially on whether the debt model specication correctly accounts for the
multiplicity of creditors and/or initial collateralization of the debt.
Our relative estimate of the default risk premia, pf , indicates that default premia are
lower with dispersed debt compared to single creditor debt. This nding should not come as a
surprise: Concerning the creditor dispersion dimension, recall that on the one hand, dispersed
creditors are vulnerable to dilution threats, but on the other hand, they are protected from
strategic default threats. This indicates that creditors' exposure to the dilution threat is less
important than their exposure to strategic default. Intuitively, the strategic default option
allows the shareholder to obtain earlier and/or larger coupon concessions, since in both cases,
the aggregate coupon value at the ecient abandonment point will be the same, N ~0. As
a consequence, using dispersed debt rather than privately held debt may allow to reduce
the default premium by a large margin, since it credibly commits the debt issuer against
strategic default threats, without causing any distortion in the underlying real behavior - in
both cases, there is ecient abandonment at ~y.
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VI. Possible Extensions and Conclusion
This paper presents a fully dynamic explanation for the conventional wisdom that creditors
enjoy some protection against opportunistic default threat if debt is dispersed among many
investors. This is explained by the lack of intertemporal consistency of concessions which
are not backed up by guarantees that an extended part of their liquidation right is safe
from continued expropriation. The natural candidate for such a guarantee is the addition of
collateral, but other forms of commitment are conceivable.
The paper identies in fact a \double commitment problem" for the debtor: First, to
make debt renegotiation possible, the creditor needs the possibility to commit to inexpro-
priable liquidation rights (collateral). Second, once the creditor has discretion over how and
when to attribute these inexpropriable liquidation rights, she needs to commit not to exercise
this option prematurely. With regard to the second commitment problem, our analysis was
conned to the study of a single possible solution, collateral design.
There are a couple of other mechanisms having the same potential of solving the second
commitment problem, that is mechanisms which allow to commit to an ecient timing of
the exchange oers. To conclude, we want to briey mention two such devices, concern-
ing two well-known nancial vehicles which when optimally designed, can lead to ecient
abandonment at ~y, just as the optimal design of collateral can do, as captured by Condition
1.
(i) Callable Debt. Suppose the rm issues fully collateralized debt at x0, as a combination
of several bonds. Some bond issue have zero initial collateral, but there is also at least one
bond which carries a high aggregate collateral and which is callable: The shareholder can
call the zero bond at any time for a xed call price. This call feature is attached only to
the bonds which carry collateral. Therefore, only after calling a collateralized bond can the
shareholder use the portion of the liquidation value over which she just gained discretion
in order to renegotiate coupon concession from the holders of the non-collateralized coupon
bonds. Consequently, setting the right call prices, the shareholder can credibly commit to
exercise the calls exactly at the right trigger points.
(ii) Maturity Structure. A short debt maturity represents a vehicle committing the
debtor to abstain from a premature use of the option to renegotiate. The intuition is as
follows: Under short maturity, a given fraction of the debt will have to be renanced between
the exchange oer trigger point and the nal abandonment trigger level. The earlier the
exchange oer trigger point, the higher this probability. Therefore, investors anticipate that
the probability for enjoying full repayment of the principal is increasing if the renegotiation
proposal is launched early rather than late. As a result, debtholders will require a more
generous exchange oer in order to be willing to surrender their contracts.
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The choice of average maturity determines what fraction of debt is expected to be re-
nanced between renegotiation and abandonment: If maturity is very long, none of the debt
is expected to be renanced, with the incentive consequences studied earlier. If maturity is
very short, almost all of the debt is fully and instantaneously renanced, so the debtor has
no incentive at all to propose exchange oers, just as with fully collateralized debt.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that n1 debtholders have accepted one oer, even though the
shareholder can make a second oer in the future. These senior creditors are receiving a coupon
1 since accepting the rst oer, at x1. Now, they are aware that the shareholder's optimal second





















P(x2  ys) :













P(xt  ys) :













P(xt  ys) :








This contradicts the initial assumption, that n1 bondholders have accepted one oer. QED.

















P(xk  ys) :
In regime k, i.e for xt 2 (xk+1; xk ], debtholders who have tendered receive a coupon k until the


















P(xt  xk+1) :
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P(xk  ys) :
























Now, when the k + 1th exchange oer is triggered at (xt) = (xk+1), the most opportunistic oer

















P(xk+1  ys) :
To be time consistent, the kth exchange oer must guarantee that the future value of tendering
debtholders' claim just before the k + 1th oer is greater or equal to its value if the shareholder



























P(xk+1  ys) :








[1   P(xk  ys)]
P(xk  ys)
: QED.
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is by backwards induction. First, we show that the tendering
constraint must be binding in the last (the Kth) exchange oer. Then, we show that by induction,
the tendering constraint must also be binding in all previous exchange oers.
To simplify notation, we consider strategies where nk = K, for all k 2 f1; :::;Kg, i.e. the debtor
oers K new contracts in each round. This is without loss of generality.





















P(xK  ys) ;















































P(xt  xK) :
Next, we develop an argument which holds for any given sequence of collateral changes, Ck(x),
for k = 0; 1; :::;K. This argument must then also be valid for any optimal sequence of collateral
values. Replacing in the shareholder's problem in regime K   1, for xt 2 [xK ; xK 1):
max
(K;xK)
(xt)  (ys)P(xt ys)   N
K 1





[P(xt  xK)  P(xt  ys)] (70)





[1   P(xK  ys)]
P(xK  ys)
; (71)
xt  xK  ys (72)
ys = argmax








We know that the second part of the constraint (72) cannot be binding, because in regime K 1,
K 1 < K . We can disregard this constraint when setting up the (Kuhn-Tucker) Lagrangean of
this problem, which we write as:
max
K;xK



















   [xK   xt]
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that the Kth tendering constraint (71)
is not binding, i.e.  = 0. We distinguish two cases:










[P(xt  xK) P(xt  ys)]











By construction, K < K 1. Hence @L=@xK > 0, contradicting the assumption that  =  = 0.
Case B:  6= 0, i.e. the rst part of (72) is binding. We have then  = 0 and  6= 0 and hence
xK = xt. The (Kuhn-Tucker) Lagrangean becomes:
max
K;xK
L = (xt) (ys)P(xt ys)  N
K

[1 P(xt  ys)]   [xK   xt] :
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which simplies to @L=@K =  N= [1 P(xt  ys)] by the envelope theorem. Hence @L=@K < 0,
contradicting the assumption that  = 0.
Thus, in Case A and in Case B there is a contradiction to the assumption that  = 0. This
concludes the proof that the Kth tendering constraint is binding.
It remains to develop the induction argument. Consider regime k < K, with a coupon of k.
The proof by contradiction mirrors the one for the Kth regime. Consider Case A where  =  = 0.











giving a contradiction as @L
@xk+1
6= 0 is implied by k > k+1. Hence if  = 0, necessarily  6= 0.
Consider Case B where  = 0 but  6= 0. At any state xt in the regime k, the rst order condition



















which simplies to @L=@k =  N= [1 P(xt  ys)] < 0 by the envelope theorem, contradicting
 = 0. QED.








(1 P(x0  y))g: (78)
To prove that (x0) > V




(1 P(x0  ŷ)) + V
(ŷ)P(x0  ŷ) > V
(x0) : (79)
A coupon 0 satisfying (79) is feasible if it satises the feasibility condition
ŷ (0; V
(x)=N) < x0: (80)
By dierentiating (78), (80) is equivalent to the following rst-order condition, evaluated locally










P(x0  ŷ) : (81)










P(x0  ŷ) : (82)
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Since the RHS of (82) is strictly positive, and
@P(x0ŷ)
@ŷ
> 0, (82) leads to a contradiction if
0

  (x̂0) < 0. Hence any 0 such that
0

< (x0) implies that ŷ < x0. Therefore, we are left
with showing that there exists a 0 such that (i) (79) holds and (ii)
0

< (x̂0). We demonstrate
this by construction. Choose




Since (x0) > (ŷ),
0

< (x0). Finally, by construction of (83):
0

(1  P(x0 ŷ)) + V
(ŷ)P(x0 ŷ) = (x0) (ŷ)P(x0  ŷ) + V
(ŷ)P(x0  ŷ)
= V (x0 j ŷ) > V
(x0) ;
where the last inequality follows from our parameter assumptions on () and V (). QED.
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Figure 1: The Firm under the First Best Policy
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Table 1: Closed-Form Asset Pricing Formulas in the GBM-Linear Structure.
The table gives the expression of the constants (aA; bA; cA) such that A(xt) = aA + bA xt + cA x

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Table 2: Price Impact of Accounting for (i) Creditor Dispersion and (ii) Collateral Design.
Input parameters are  = 0:02,  = 0:20, 1 = 1, 

1 = 1=2, 0 = 0, 

0 = 1=2, r = 0:05, 0 = 0:015, C

0 (ŷ) = 0:04 and dC

0 (ŷ)=dŷ
is such that ŷ(0;C

0 (x)) equals ~y.
Decision trigger level: Value
Ex-ante optimal abandonment ~y 0.6126
Shareholder's ex post optimal abandonment (fully collateralized) ŷf 1.8377
First renegotiation (single Creditor) xs 3.0629
Bond Value at shareholder abandonment: Value
Multiple Creditors + Optimal Collateral D(0)(~y) 0.0400
Fully Collateralized Debt (Non-renegotiable) D(0)f (ŷf) 0.1419
Single Creditor D(0)s (~y) 0.0806
Bond Value at xt = 4: Value
Multiple Creditors + Optimal Collateral D(0)(xt) 0.2866






Risk Premium at xt = 4: Value/
Multiple Creditors + Optimal Collateral p(xt) 4.46 %
Fully Collateralized Debt (Non-renegotiable) pf (xt) 15.41 %
Single Creditor ps(xt) 21.16 %
Relative dierence pf (xt) 245 %
Relative dierence ps(xt) 375 %
Credit Spreads at xt = 4: Value (bps)
Multiple Creditors + Optimal Collateral s(xt) 23.34
Fully Collateralized Debt (Non-renegotiable) sf (xt) 91.08
Single Creditor ss(xt) 134.27
Relative dierence ss(xt) 290 %
Relative dierence sf(xt) 475 %
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Figure 2 : Price Impact of Accounting for (i) Creditor Dispersion and (ii) Collateral Design
Input parameters are  = 0:02,  = 0:20, 1 = 1, 

1 = 1=2, 0 = 0, 

0 = 1=2, r = 0:05, 0 = 0:015, C

0 (ŷ) = 0:04 and
dC0 (ŷ)=dŷ is such that ŷ(0; C

0 (x)) equals ~y. Figure (a) compares the debt values we obtain when shareholders face dispersed




(xt), and if (ii) the debt is held by a single creditor, D
(0)
s (xt). The residual value of the rm, V
(xt),
and the debt value if it was riskless, =, are also exhibited. Figure (b) compares the resulting risk premium in each of the three
situations depicted above, p(xt), pf (xt) and ps(xt), respectively. Here, risk premia are expressed in percentage of debt coupon
0. Figure (c) compares the associated credit spreads in each of these three situations, s(xt), sf (xt) and ss(xt), respectively.
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